


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29 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence *Eup*
SUBJECT : Revised Articles for U.S. Non-
Proliferation Treaty

1. Paragraph 8 contains a recommendation for action.

2. At the meeting of the Committee of Principals on 17 June, Secretary Rusk noted that the Deputy Chief of the Soviet delegation at Geneva, Vorontsov, had said that the crux of the problem of non-proliferation was "physical access" to nuclear weapons by West Germany, and had indicated that a U.S. amendment to cover physical access would be an important move. The Secretary said that he would be circulating new treaty language embodying this phrase. A draft of the new language is attached. Also attached is a copy of the present U.S. draft treaty, and a cable from Geneva reporting Vorontsov's remarks.

3. The revised articles do not necessarily constitute a complete treaty by themselves; they directly replace only Articles I, II, and VI of the present draft. The remaining articles could be retained, but the Secretary does not make clear whether and to what extent this would be done. Nor is his staff clear on this point.

4. The U.S. will take the position that barring "physical access" to nuclear weapons does not rule out the MLF, the ANF, and similar alliance arrangements because such arrangements do not confer physical access. Thus, the new language represents no concession on this issue. It remains doubtful, therefore, that the Soviets will buy it, because they apparently remain adamant in opposing what they consider to be a German finger on the nuclear trigger.

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5. If this is so, the new language will not break the log jam at Geneva. It might, however, demonstrate to the world a U.S. desire to reach meaningful disarmament agreements and a U.S. willingness to go as far as possible in meeting Soviet wishes, and thus place the onus for lack of progress on the USSR. On the negative side, the new language might make it more difficult for the U.S. to defend the MLF than the language it replaces.

6. It is just possible that the Soviets are now ready to do business on our terms, but need some apparent concession to save face. As the Secretary put it at the meeting of the Principals, the Soviets might be willing to gamble that the MLF is dead, whether or not we acknowledge that our non-proliferation treaty bars it.

7. The issues involved here are largely those of policy and the primary concern of State, Defense, and the AEC. The attached reply to Secretary Rusk has been drafted accordingly.




8. It is ~~very~~ ^{important} that you sign the attached letter to the Secretary.





Attachments:

1. Letter for signature
2. Revised articles of treaty
3. Draft treaty (22 Mar 66 revision)
4. State Incoming cable 2502 from Geneva

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - DCI w/all atts
- 1 - Exec Registry w/o atts
 - 1 - DD/I w/o atts
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